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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
MARC CHESNUT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals his conviction for theft under
Sections 76-6-404 and 76-6-412, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury in the lower court found the defendant guilty
of exercizing unauthorized control over an operable motor
vehicle, and judgment was subsequently entered against him as a
third degree felony.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment below.

-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
After midnight on the 27th of June 1979, the defendant,
Marc Chesnut, was stopped while walking his friend's motorcycle
in the street in front of the friend's house.

The defendant

told the officer who stopped him that the motorcycle was his
neighbor's and that he planned on riding it in a nearby vacant
field (T-10) .

The officer awakened the neighbor who stated

the defendant did not have permission to ride his motorcycle
(T-29).

An additional officer, Officer Evans, was called who

effected the arrest of the defendant for auto theft (T-22)·.
At trial a principal issue was whether the defendant
had the intention to permanently deprive the owner of his motorcycle, as required under Section 76-6-404, U.C.A.
amended.

(1953), as

The arresting officer, Officer Evans, testified that

the defendant told him on the way to police headquarters that
he had taken the motorcycle because the defendant owed him
money (T-23) .

The defendant took the stand and denied that

statement (T-61, 62}.

He testified that he tried to get per-

mission that night by waking the owner (T-53,55) and that since
they were friends he felt it would
bike for awhile (T-59).

be~lright

if he took the

Additionally, he testified that his

intention was to return the motorcycle after an "hour or so,"
immediately following

~1is

ride ('l'-54, 55, 59}.

After the presentation of the State's case-in-chief,
the defendant moved to dismiss the case due to the State's
failure to present evidence that the defendant's intention was
to permanently deprive the owner of his vehicle (T-47) .

At the
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close of all the evidence, the defense moved for a directed
verdict on the same grounds (T-71) .

Both these motions were

denied.
At sentencing defense counsel had submitted motions
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial.
These motions, relating to the issues raised in this appeal,
were denied.
Further, the trial court refused to allow a jury
instruction as to the lesser included offense of "joyriding,"
Section 41-1-109, U.C.A.

(1953}, as amended (T-70).

The

instruction was founded upon the defendant's testimony at trial
and the defense's theory of the case.
The trial court also denied the defense permission to
cross-examine the owner of the motorcycle, Mr. Covington, with
regard to the motives behind his testimony (T-38) .

Prosecution

objections were sustained by the court despite the fact that
the arresting officer in this case, Officer Evans, was also the
officer investigating the witness in a separate matter (T-38).
The trial concluded on September 19, 1979, with the
jury returning a verdict of guilty to the charge of theft of an
operable motor vehicle, Section 76-6-404 and Section 76-6-412,
U.C.A.

(1953), as amended.

On February 22, 1980 judgment was

entered thereon by the court.

TDis appeal was then filed on

March 4, 1980.

-3-
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ARGUMENT
I.

BY FAILING TO PRESENT "INDEPENDENT, CLEAR AND
CONVINCING" EVIDENCE, SHOWING DEFENDANT'S
INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE, THE STATE DID
NOT ESTABLISH THE CORPUS DELICTI FOR AUTO
THEFT.

Section 76-6-404, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, states

that:
A person conunits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to
deprive him thereof.
{Emphasis added.]
Section 76-6-401(3), U.C.A.

(1953}, as amended,_

defines the meaning of "purpose to deprive" that applies to
Section 76-6-404:
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious
object:
(a} To withhold property permanently or for so
extended a period or to use under such circumstances
that a substantial portion of its economic value,
or of the use and benefit thereof, would be
lost.
{Emphasis added.]
Thus, a necessary element of the crime defined by
Section 76-6-404 is that the person possess an intention to
permanently deprive the owner of his property.
In the case of State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175 (Utah
19771, the issue was whether or not the corpus del cti had been
made out so as to sustain a conviction for driving and inflicting
injury while under the influence of intoxicants.

This court held

that the State must "present evidence that the injury specified
in the crime occurred'' for the court to sustain the conviction.
Id. at 176.

Applied to the facts at hand, Knoefler requires that

the State present evidence specifically demonstrating that the
defendant possessed the intention to

nt:lrm;:in.on+-1 .. ,

,.:i~,..._ .... ..:

··-
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owner of the motor vehicle in order to establish the corpus
delicti.
State v. Ferry, 275 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954), and State v.
Weldon 314 P.2d 353 (Utah 1957) set standards for the quality
of evidence required to demonstrate the intention for corpus
delicti purposes.
In Ferry the court reversed a conviction of carnal
knowledge for lack of "independent, clear and convincing evidence of the corpus delicti" other than a confession of the
accused.

Id.at 173 State v. Weldon, supra, relied upon Ferry

and reinforced the requirement that there be a high quality of
evidence, "clear and convincing," and that it be "independent"
of the accused's confession.
Weldon involved a conviction for conspiring to commit
a robbery.

It is significant here for demonstrating that a

"plausible argun1ent" that evidence supporting a specific element
of the crime charged does not establish the corpus deli.cti.
It is appreciated that a plausible argument
can be made that the facts here shown,
independent of the confession, constitute
sufficient independent evidence of the corpus
delicti . . . Id. at 357 IEmphasis added].
The court required a high standard as to the quality of
evidence.

Despite there being "A plausible argument" that the

evidence satisfied the corpus delicti, despite a possible
"sufficiency'' under some other standard of proof, the evidence
presented did not meet the "independent, clear and convincing"
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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standard in force in Utah.

Such is the case here with regard

to the defendant's alleged intention to permanently deprive
the owner of his motorcycle.
Excluding the alleged confession of defendant (T-23),
the evidence upon which the state relies to meet the "independent,·
clear and convincing'' standard is the following:

the defendant

was walking a motorcycle away from his friend's house after midnight, along the street, and in the direction of his own house
which was on the same block.

This evidence differs markedly from

the evidence needed in other similar cases to demonstrate that
there was an intention to permanently deprive.
In Webber v. State 376 P.2d 348 (Ok.Cr.Ap. 1962) intention to permanently deprive sufficient to meet the corpus
delicti standards was inferred after the car had been driven to
another state, wrecked, abandoned, and not discovered until one
week later.

See also State v. Daniel, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978).

Nothing of that nature has occurred here.
' house
defendant was within a few yards of the owners

On the facts,
~nd

walking

the motorcycle toward his own home on the same block (T-10).
This does not constitute "independent, clear and convincing"
evidence that the defendant had an intention to permanently
deprive.

At best it could be said only that there was clear

and convincing evidence that the appellant exercised unauthorized
control over the property.

Accordingly, the State's evidence

does not meet the standard necessary to establish the corpus
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The rul~ng on the Motion to Dismiss should be

delicti.
reversed.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF "JOYRIDING,"
SECTION 41-1-109 (1953), AS A.MENDED.

At the commencement of the trial the defense requested that the court give a jury instruction that pertains
to the offense of "joyriding."
refused.

This instruction was later

The defense took exception and cited the refusal as

error (T-70).
Recent Utah Supreme Court cases have made it clear that
"joyriding" is a lesser included offense in the crime of auto
theft.

In State v. Cornish 508 P.2d 360 (Utah 1977), the

defendant was charged with auto theft under Section 76-6-404,
U.C.A.

(1953}_, as amended, yet convicted of joyriding under

Section 41-1-109, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended.

This court upheld

the conviction as prope:r, stating that "joyriding" was a lesser
included offense.

The reason stated for this holding was that

all essential elements of the theft statute and the "joyriding"
statute were similar with the exception of the requirement as to
intent.

"The only fact the state is not required to establish

for 'joyriding,' which is required for theft, is the intent to
permanently deprive."

Id. at 361.

Similarly in State v. Lloyd 568 P.2d 357, 358 (Utah
1977) :
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The contention stated by defendant that the
U1lawful taking of a vehicle under Section
41-1-109, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, is not
a lesser and included offense of theft of
an operable motor vehicle under Section
76-6-404, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, supra,
is rejected for reasons stated today in
State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360.
In the Cornish case the court went on to say that
the burden of showing the intention to permanently deprive
required by the theft statute, as compared to the intention to
temporarily deprive, required by the joyriding statute, was
upon the state.

Further, the Court stated that:

"If there is an issue as to whether the prosecution has sustained the burden, or if the
defendant presents evidence under his theory
which negates the factors in Section 76-6-401
(3) Idefining intention to permanently deprive] , the matter of circumstances of the
intent should be presented to the trier of
fact."
508 P.2d at 362
It is this issue upon which the defense here

relie~.

Evidence

was presented by the defense which negates a finding of the
necessary intent to permanently deprive.

There was an issue as

to whether or not the defendant's intent was to permanently or
temporarily deprive.
Defendant testified under oath that his intention was

I

solely to have possession of the vehicle for an hour or so (T-54).
Further, he presented evidence for taking the motorcycle without
asking permission.

(He couldn't wake the owner),

(T-53, 55),

for pushing the motorcycle instead of riding it (the vehicle was
out of gas)

(T-55), and for wishing to ride the motorcycle at

that hour (others had done it at that time of night, the neighbors
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

who could most likely hear the noise were out of town, the
field and school yard were lighted) .
All of the above factors must at least be construed as
"evidence presented" or creating "an issue" as to whether or not
the defendant's intention was to deprive the owner permanently
or temporarily.

These matters of evidence create the situation

as described in Cornish.

Thus the question of permanent or

temporary intent to deprive, auto theft versus joyriding, needed
to be submitted to the jury, the trier of fact.
The case of State v. Gillion, 463 P.2d 811 (Utah
1970) , supports the position that the Court took in Cornish and
deals with the Court's obligations to instruct the jury that
joyriding is a lesser and included offense to the crime of auto
theft.
In Gillion, the Court held that the presentation of
any reasonable evidence supporting a lesser included offense
requires that a jury instruction for the lesser included offense
be given.

Failure to do so results in reversible error.
One of the foundational principles in regard to
the submission of issues to juries is that where
the parties so request they are entitled to have
instruction given upon their theory of the case;
and this includes lesser offenses if any reasonable view of the evidence would support such a
verdict.
Id. at 812.
!Emphasis added.]
The Court stressed the fact that the jury should not

be presented with an either/or proposition.

Additionally, the

question which the court had on appeal was not whether any
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reasonable evidence justified the verdict of the jury, but
rather whether there was "any reasonable view of the evidence"
which would support a theory based upon a lesser and included
offense.

If there was such a view of the evidence, the Court

was required to instruct the jury as to that lesser and ineluded offense.
As stated above, there exists ample evidence in the
case at hand to draw a "reasonable view" that joyriding might
have existed.

The defendant testified, that his intent was only

to ride for an "hour or so."
shows this entirely plausible.

The circumstantial evidence ·also
A field for riding was nearby,

defendant had heard others riding at night before, and the only
person he was seriously concerned about waking was his mother
(T-61).

To conclude, Cornish requires a matter to be submitted
to a jury when there is "an issue."

Gillion requires submission

of lesser included offenses if there is "any reasonable view of
the evidence" to support it.

Defendant's proposed instruction

for joyriding qualified on both grounds.

The Court's refusal to

submit it to the jury constituted reversible error.
III.

REFUSAL TO PERMIT QUESTIONS AS TO THE STATE'S
WITNESS, MR. COVINGTON'S, MOTIVE FOR
TESTIFYING WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

During cross examination of the State's witness,
Kenny Covington, the Court sustained objections to a line of
questioning which would have demonstrated the witness' motive for

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testifying as he had (T-36, 40).

The defense sought to show a

relationship existed between the arresting officer in the
matter at hand, Officer Evans, and Mr. Covington.

Officer Evans

was at that time the investigating officer in a crime for which

'

.
he had investigated Mr. Covingtons
involvement.

The Court

relied upon Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to sustain the
objection (T-37).
Rule 45 allows a trial judge to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if admission would result in an undue consumption of time, create confusion or prejudice in the minds of
the jury or unfairly surprise another party.
"Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the
Judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if
he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption
of time, of (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or
misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered."
This discretionary right of the trial judge, however, must be
balanced against the specific right to cross-examine a witness
as to his motive for testifying.

This right has both statutory

and constitutional roots.
Section 78-24-1, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, provides

in part that "in every case the credibility of the witness may be
drawn in question . . . by his motives; and the jury are the
exclusive judges of his credibility."

Cross-examination as to

motives is vital if the jury is to play its proper role.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the case of Davis v. Alaska 415 U.S. 308, 316
(1974) the United States Supreme Court emphasized the
constitutional right to cross-examine as to motive:
Cross examination is the principal means by which
the believability of a witness and the truth of
the testimony is tested. . . We have recognized
that the exposure of a witness' motivation in
testifying is a proper and important function of
the constitutionally protected right of crossexamination.
This statement was relied upon in the Utah case of
State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977), where the Court reemphasized the "long recognized.

. . particular significatice of

cross-examination and the fact that the interest of a witness is
a matter which the jury must weigh against his credibility."
Id. at 1388.

This restated the rule from State v. Cerrar,

207 P.597 (Utah 1922) where the Court held:
The interest of a witness in any particular case
in which he becomes a witness may always be shown,
and the effect, if any, upon the weight of the
testimony is always a question for the jury. Id.
at 602.
Hence, there are strong and deep rooted statutory and constitutional rights accorded to the right to cross-examine in order to
determine a witness' motive for testifying.
State v. Maestas, supra, is of particular

significan~

here as it sets out the standards to determine when an error in
limiting cross-examination results in prejudicial error.

In

Maestas· the defendant was convicted of assault by a prisoner and
appealed on grounds that limiting cross-examination as to the

victim~ motive for testifying as he did was prejudicial error.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The defense sought to demonstrate that the victim testified
as he did so that he would be removed from maximum security
at the prison.

Counsel was prohibited from pursuing a line of

questioning that would show an agreement between the testifying
police officer to the effect that the victim would be removed
from maximum security depending upon how he testified.

The

Court held that there was error, but that it was not prejudicial error.

The reason that the error was not prejudicial was

because the Court held the issue of an agreement between the
police officer and the victim made it to the jury despite ·the
limitations on the cross examination.
While neither Hart fthe victim] nor other witnesses
were actually asked whether any promise was given,
the implication that one may have been was clearly
before the jury.
Courts have found no prejudice where information
that may be brought out by further questioning was
already before the jury either from the testimony
of others or by implication from the witness' own
testimony.
Id. at 1389.
Despite the limitations on cross examination, and the fact that
they were error, the issue had sufficiently made its way to the
jury in the Maestas case.
Here, however, though the issue is identical, the
facts are not.

Unlike Maestas, here the jury did not receive

evidence to judge whether the witness' testimony (Mr. Covington's)
was influenced by the ability of the officer to be lenient or
harsh with the charge for which he had been investigated.

The

only indications that the jury had as to this relationship were
during the restricted cross examination of Mr. Covington
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(T-36, 40) and another series of questions directly following (T-40, 42}.
The pertinent part of the latter series of questions
was as follows:
Question:

!Defense] Has anyone told you that
you had to testify you did not
give him (defendant} permission
to ride the bike?

Answer:

[Mr. Covington] What do you mean
I had to testify?

Question:

[Defense] So we are sure you understand the question, Kenny, I will
ask this again in different words.
Since the time that you came out of
your house on the 27th of June at
2:45 in the morning, have you had
conversations with anyone concerning
your testimony?

Answer:

No, not really.

Question:

You said before that you had talked
with Officer Evans earlier. Was it
last Sunday you said?

Answer:

He told me when I had to be here and
that I had to testify, you know.

Question:

{The Court] What Mr. Schumacher is
asking you, did anybody tell you how
you had to testify?

Answer:

No, they just told me if I didn't tell
the truth I would be the one that
went to jail (T-40, 42).

I just -- No.

This series of questions did bring before the jury Mr. Covington's
testimony that no one told him that he did not give the defendant
permission to ride his motorcycle.

What it did not bring before

the jury was the very real ability of Officer Evans to increase
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mr. Covington's chances of actually going to jail for another
crime, depending upon Mr. Covington's testimony.

This relation-

ship, that of both Officer Evans and Mr. Covington to another
pending criminal charge, did not come before the jury.

The

reason for this was the denial of the defense's questions on
cross-examination as shown below:
Question:

Okay. You have talked within the last
few days with Officer Kenny Evans about
the trial?

Answer:

IMr. Covington]

Question:

When was that?

Answer:

Sunday.

Question:

Where did you talk with him?

Answer:

In the cops car.

Question:

Did you go anywhere with him?

Answer:

Yes.

Question:

Where did you go?

Answer:

County Jail.

Question:

Was that in connection with an investigation he was doing?

Yes.

Mr. Anderson IProsecution] Your Honor,
I object.
[Objection
sustained] (T-3 6, 3 7)
Question:

Did Officer Evans question you concerning
what your testimony would be today?

Answer:

He just told me if I lied I would go to
jail.

Question:

He had already taken you to the jail
that night?
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Question:

Mr. Anderson:

Your Honor, I object
to that question.

The Witness:

This was over a different
thing.

The Court:

Just a moment$
I sustain
that objection.
I will
instruct the jury not to
pay any attention to the
question or the answer.

(By Mr. Schumacher) Isn't it true he had
arrested you for another offense?
Mr. Anderson:
The Court:

Your Honor, I object.

I sustain that objection.

Although these questions do bring out that there
was a criminal charge against Mr. Covington and that Officer
Evans was involved in the case, it does not establish the fact
that the charge was pending and that Officer Evans as investigating officer had a very real ability to influence Mr.
Covington's testimony.
Failure to allow this relationship to come before
the jury constitutes error under an infringement of the right to
cross-examine under Davis and Section 78-24-1, U.C.A.
amended, as cited above.

(1953), as

Because the error actually prevented

significant evidence from coming before the jury, Maestas shows
that the error was prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
The appellant has presented three arguments as to why
the Court should reverse the judgment of the Court below:
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(1)

The State did not provide "independent, clear and convincing"
evidence of the defendant's alleged intention to permanently
deprive necessary to establish the corpus delicti of auto theft
under Section 76-6-404 U.C.A.

(1953), as amended.

(2) The trial

Court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the
jury on the defendant's proposed instruction for the lesser and
included offense of "joyriding," Section 41-1-109 U.C.A.
(1953), as amended.

(3) The trial Court further committed pre-

judicial error by denying the defense permission to crossexamine the State's witness, Mr. Covington, as to his motives for
testifying as he did.
For the reasons above, the appellant prays that the
judgment of the lower Court be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Utah County
107 East 100
Provo, Utah

Assoc.

Attorney for DefendantAppellant
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